Managerial accountability for payroll expense and firm-size wage effects by Zubrickas, Robertas
Managerial Accountability for Payroll Expense and
Firm-Size Wage E¤ects
Robertas Zubrickasy
February 14, 2011
Abstract
We argue that job performance appraisal is an agency problem between a man-
ager and his employees featuring asymmetric transfer values: Ratings given by
the manager are money equivalent for the employees but only partially so for the
manager. The asymmetry assumption is based on evidence that managers are not
held fully accountable for payroll expense incurred, which, we argue, stems from
the misalignment of managerial compensation with the prots of the rm. Other
evidence also shows that the problem of managerial unaccountability is more aggra-
vated in larger rms. In this paper, we develop a nested agency model of economic
organization of a rm with unaccountable managers, which in equilibrium obtains
the rm-size wage e¤ects the large-rm wage premium and inverse relationship
between rm size and wage dispersion. We also relate and explain the compression
of ratings phenomenon from literature on organizational psychology.
1 Introduction
Empirical studies on payroll expenses unequivocally show that rm size matters for em-
ployee wages: large rms pay more on average, but variation in wages is bigger in small
rms, everything else equal (Brown & Medo¤ (1989); Oi & Idson (1999); Troske (1999)).
This evidence suggests that incentives for employees in place di¤er across small and large
rms. The still open question is what factors variable across rms of di¤erent size can be
attributed to the incidence of these rm-size wage e¤ects. In this paper, we explore one
dimension, in which rms of di¤erent size do di¤er namely, manager accountability for
payroll expense that can lead to di¤erences in incentive schemes producing the rm-size
I would like to thank Ailko van der Veen and Karl Wärneryd. Financial support from the Jan
Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
yUniversity of Zurich, Department of Economics, Winterthurerstrasse 30, CH8006 Zurich, Switzer-
land. E-mail: robertas.zubrickas@econ.uzh.ch.
1
wage e¤ects in question. When studying the link between manager accountability and
employee wage schedules, we also address the phenomenon of the compression of job per-
formance appraisal ratings from organizational psychology literature (see, e.g., Murphy
& Cleveland (1995) or Prendergast (1999) for an economist account of the issue), which
we relate and jointly explain together with the regularities of rm-size wage e¤ects.
Literature on organizational psychology provides evidence about managers not held
fully accountable for the payroll expenses incurred and that they do use discretion over
their subordinatespay to their own advantage (see Longenecker et al. (1987)). Further-
more, there is also evidence that managersbudget-related behavior, including the degree
of discretion over subordinatespay, depends on the organizational structure of the rm,
with rm size among its main characteristics. In particular, in small rms managers are
found to work under tighter and narrowly-dened nancial control systems, whereas in
large rms managers tend to have more control and discretion over the budgetary mat-
ters they are in charge of (Bruns & Waterhouse (1975)). In this paper, we study what
implications on employee wage schedules a varying degree of managerial accountability
can have. More specically, with the link between rm size and the degree of managerial
accountability in mind, we study the question if di¤erences in managerial accountability
across small and large rms can be behind the rm-size wage e¤ects observed.
We address the question raised above through a three-tier agency model of the eco-
nomic organization of a rm. The size of a rm and its organizational structure are taken
as exogenous. Similarly to Tirole (1986), we divide the vertical managerial structure of a
rm into the following tiers: i) the owner(s) of a rm (including other residual claimants
such as top executive management), ii) (low- and middle-ranking) managers, and iii)
employees. The interaction between the tiers is modelled as follows (more thoroughly
discussed later). It is only the employees who produce output. The managers supervise
and evaluate the performance of their employees, which the managers can perfectly ob-
serve and condition their rewards upon. The owner designs compensation schemes for
the managers, which depend on the output produced by their employees in charge and
the payroll expense incurred. The key assumption of the model is that, unlike managers,
the owner observes only imperfectly an employees cost of production e¤ort.1 This asym-
metry in information prevents the owner from perfectly aligning managers incentives
with the prot maximization of the rm. Based on the empirical evidence quoted above
(with more provided below), this assumption of the model takes the form that managers
do not internalize in full or, equivalently, cannot be made fully accountable for the pay-
roll expenses incurred when evaluating their employeesperformance with the degree of
manager accountability decreasing in rm size.
1 ...similarly to Axiom 1 of Tirole (1986, p. 183), which reads that the principal lacks either the time
or the knowledge required to supervise the agent.Later in the paper, we address this assumption more
specically.
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We show that incorporating managerssoft budget constraint into a nested two-stage
agency model with hidden information produces theoretical predictions that o¤er a good
match with the empirical stylized facts on wage patterns. Therefore, we argue that
manager accountability (or rather the lack of it) can be a cause of the rm-size e¤ects
on wage schedules. In particular, we show that the less accountable for payroll expense
a manager is, the more the employee e¤ort he aims to elicit in attempt to maximize his
own compensation. On the other hand, the less accountable a manager is, the more the
owner lowers an upper bound on employee rewards in attempt to limit the managers
payroll expense. As a result, we obtain that in larger rms there is less variation in
employee wages due to managerscompressing employee rewards at the upper bound of
the reward scale imposed, whereas the average wage paid can be higher than that in
smaller rms, respectively. Furthermore, we also obtain that in our model small rms
are more protable than large ones, which is consistent with empirical evidence on small
rmshigher stock returns and, supposedly, their higher protability, see Banz (1981)
and Fama & French (1992). (We use the latter evidence to distinguish our explanation
of the rm-size wage e¤ects from other alternative explanations.)
In Section 2, we discuss in greater detail the current practice of employee and man-
ager compensation and its main features, which stand behind our modeling framework.
In Section 2, we also discuss related literature on the rm-size wage e¤ects and compres-
sion of job performance appraisal ratings with focus on existing explanations of these
phenomena. In Section 3, we develop and solve our nested agency model. In Section
4, we discuss the properties of the wage schedules obtained in the equilibrium, and in
Section 5 we discuss our ndings in relationship to the existing empirical evidence. The
last section concludes the study.
2 Background and Motivation
At the cornerstone of this paper lies, in the words of Alchian & Demsetz (1972), metering
input productivity and metering rewards.Di¤erently from Alchian & Demsetz (1972),
however, in this paper we study the problem of metering employeesinputs and rewards
from the perspective of an owner-manager relationship rather than from the perspective
of a manager-employee relationship. The idea is that given the existing practice of man-
agerial compensation, described below, the interests of the owner and a manager with
respect to employee compensation may actually diverge. The monitoring and appraisal
of employeesindividual e¤ort levels are done by low- and middle-ranking managers, who
at the same time are not residual claimants, nor their pay can be perfectly related to
the rms prots.2 Typically, as an alternative to prot-sharing rules, the owner of a
2According to surveys by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1999 only 1.4 percent of US business
establishments granted stock options to their nonexecutive employees. It is suggested that the reason
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rm (or rather its CEO) o¤ers her managers a compensation scheme, which depends on
their accomplishing individual objectives (the so-called management by objectives) or
on their performance evaluation adjusted for the rms overall protability (see Bruns &
McKinnon (1992); Milkovich &Wigdor (1991)). In addition, the owner sets up objectives
for managers to be achieved within certain constraints employee performance appraisal
standards on how to reward (or monitor) the performance of their employees, against
which managers need to justify the ratings they give. This is done in order to prevent
managers from incurring great payroll expense when maximizing their own compensation.
But, as is suggested from the incidence of the compression of performance appraisal
ratings and other evidence of managerslack of accountability, discussed below, the ex-
isting practice of managerial compensation seems to have ine¢ ciencies. With the aim
of rewarding managers for their own accomplishments, the owner of a rm may fail to
align perfectly managersincentives with the rms prot maximization. When designing
compensation schemes for managers, the owner draws on her own knowledge about the
workings of the managerial job its contribution to the rms prots and share of to-
tal costs which may nonetheless be less accurate than that possessed by the managers.
Consequently, this asymmetry in information allows better-informed managers to bargain
for compensation schemes more advantageous to them than to the rm.3 As a result (and
as it is modelled in this paper), in pursue of a higher compensation, managers are likely
to enjoy some leeway with respect to the payroll expense resulting from their evaluation
of employee performance.
2.1 Job Performance Appraisal and Compression of Ratings
According to surveys of business organizations (for a review, see Murphy & Cleveland
(1995, p. 4)), most public and private companies between 74% and 89% of those sur-
veyed in the US, with large companies somewhat more prevalent practice a formal job
performance appraisal system, done mainly for employee salary administration purposes.
The usual way job performance appraisals work is that a supervisor (manager) rates
various aspects of his or her employeesperformance on a pre-specied scale, and each
employee is then paid in accordance to the overall rating given by the supervisor. Es-
sentially, a rating issued by a manager is money equivalent to the receiver of the rating,
i.e., an employee (but not necessarily to the issuer, i.e., the manager, since the payroll
expense incurred may entirely or to a larger extent be borne by the company).
The practice of performance appraisals, however, has fallen short of the expectations
for this is the limited incentive e¤ects associated with stock options, see Besanko et al. (2007, p.
499). Moreover, among those rms that do o¤er stock options to all their employees, an incentive-based
explanation for it is rejected, see Oyer & Schaefer (2005).
3See Milkovich & Wigdor (1991) for more on managerial compensation practices and managers
bargaining advantages.
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about their utility. The distribution of ratings typically exhibits a shallow di¤erentiation
of good from bad performance, arguably, leading to weak work incentives and ine¢ cient
performance outcomes in the end. In the psychological literature, this has been labeled
the compression of ratingsphenomenon (for comprehensive reviews, see Landy & Farr
(1983) and Murphy & Cleveland (1995); for a case study, see Murphy (1992)). Economists
see this phenomenon as one of the causes of the dominance of xed wages in company
payrolls (Prendergast (1999)), and, accordingly, raise the question of why job performance
appraisal systems are ine¢ cient in creating stronger economic incentives for employees
(for a comprehensive discussion, see Bruns (1992)).
Industrial and organizational psychologists have traditionally viewed job performance
appraisal and its consequences the compression of ratings, in particular as a measure-
ment problem. They distinguish the three most frequently encountered measurement
biases: the halo e¤ect, a tendency to rate the same on all dimensions, centrality
bias, an overreliance on the middle of the rating scale, and leniency bias, a tendency
to give extreme ratings (which is the main focus of this paper). Psychologists found no
evidence that personal characteristics of raters or ratees have any explanatory power for
the systematic patterns observed in performance appraisal, see Landy & Farr (1980).
Instead, psychologists have now come to think that performance appraisal cannot be ad-
equately understood outside its organizational context, which is a major determinant of
a raters goal-oriented rating behavior, see Murphy & Cleveland (1995).
In economic terms, job performance appraisal, if looked upon from the perspective of
the goal-oriented rating behavior of raters, can be interpreted as an agency problem with
a raters goal being own utility maximization. As already been mentioned, managers
may nd ratings as costless rewards and use these rewards in eliciting higher employee
performance levels, from which managers directly benet. Hence, job performance ap-
praisal makes an agency relationship between a manager and employees but with an
ine¢ ciency in the form of the managers having a soft budget constraint when evaluating
their subordinatesperformance.
In literature on organizational psychology, there is empirical support for managers
having leeway in their conduct of performance appraisals. Longenecker et al. (1987)
provide evidence, obtained from anonymously conducted interviews with 60 di¤erent
managers, that shows that managers manipulate the whole appraisal process to their
own advantage. Mero & Motowidlo (1995) experimentally conrm the hypothesis that
less accountable managers with accountability meaning to provide justication for the
ratings given tend to appraise their subordinates more leniently. Managersstrategic be-
havior with respect to job performance appraisal is also revealed in Murphy & Cleveland
(1995), where they summarize evidence about managers di¤erentiating employee perfor-
mance more when done for research purposes (e.g., to allocate job training resources more
e¢ ciently) rather than for salary administration purposes.
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Furthermore, it has also been observed that employee performance appraisal standards
vary greatly across di¤erent organizations, and one of the factors behind those di¤erences
is organization size. Landy & Farr (1983, p. 104105) describe how many smaller organi-
zations hold supervisor conferences to evaluate and, accordingly, reward the performance
of each employee in turn, which is not feasible in large organizations. Murphy & Cleve-
land (1995, p. 355) see decentralization as a way to increase the e¢ ciency of performance
appraisal practice in organizations, because it would allow performance appraisal stan-
dards to be tailored more accurately for every functional unit. There is also experimental
evidence showing that the degree of task interdependence among group members inversely
a¤ects the di¤erentiation of good from bad performance, see Liden & Mitchell (1983). In
other words, in (large) organizations with less precise appraisal standards managers nd
themselves more able to justify a larger variety of rating distributions issued for the same
performance outcome, which in the end makes managers less accountable for the ratings
given.4
Regarding the related literature in economics, this paper, when it comes to explaining
the compression of ratings phenomenon, is most closely related to principal-agent models
with subjective evaluation, see MacLeod (2003) and Levin (2003). The distinctive feature
of these models is that e¤ort levels are non-contractible and are rewarded according to the
principals subjective evaluation. Under the threat of a conict, the principal may nd
it futile to di¤erentiate rewards solely on her subjective performance evaluations, when
there is a great likelihood that the agent will think di¤erently of his own performance.
Unlike this strand of literature, the current paper allows for contractible (by managers)
employee e¤ort levels. Our results hinge on contractual incompleteness between the owner
and her managers stemming from asymmetric information about employee e¤ort levels
and their costs. As we are going to see, in our model the compression of ratings is the
outcome of the optimal (manager-compensation-maximizing) incentive scheme o¤ered by
a manager to his employees.
2.2 Firm-Size Wage E¤ects
As already been mentioned in the introduction, two rm-size wage e¤ects are distin-
guished. The rst one is the large-rm wage premium: large rms pay on average higher
wages, ceteris paribus. The second is the inverse relationship between wage dispersion
and rm size. Signicantly, the same two e¤ects have been documented across di¤erent
countries and industries: It seems that rm size matters. A number of explanations have
been o¤ered, some of which are discussed below, but more research on this question seems
called for (see Brown & Medo¤ (1989) and Oi & Idson (1999) for reviews).
4In the words of Bruns &Waterhouse (1975), the study cited in the introduction, in large organizations
managers tend to have more control and discretion over the budgetary matters.
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Regarding the large-rm wage premium, there is no consensus explanation for this
phenomenon: Troske (1999) tests di¤erent explanations with a comprehensive database
to show that there is still unexplained premium paid to workers of large rms. One of the
best known explanations for the large-rm wage premium is given in Idson & Oi (1999).5
They argue that the shape of wage-size relation depends on worker preferences, working
conditions, and, most importantly, technology. The idea is that large rms, exploiting
their returns to scale, can invest in more productive labor tools. Idson & Oi (1999) argue
that the systematic di¤erences observed in wage schedules can arise because in larger
rms employees, being better equipped, are more productive, as measured by output per
hour, and, therefore, they command higher wages.6 But this explanation fails to explain
why there is a lower wage dispersion in larger rms or why large rms are less protable
(especially if it is argued they are more productive), as the nancial empirical evidence
indicates to be the case (Banz (1981); Fama & French (1992)). In the current paper,
we present a di¤erent interpretation of the empirical ndings of Idson & Oi (1999). We
argue that in a larger rm employees exert on average higher e¤ort levels (and get paid
more) because of more lenient incentive schemes set by their less accountable managers,
which, on the other hand, may not be in the best interest of the rm.
At the same time, despite paying on average lower wages, small rms reward their
employeesabilities and acquired skills, such as experience, at a greater rate than do large
rms (see Garen (1985); Evans & Leighton (1989)). Generally, an inverse relationship has
been observed between wage dispersion and rm size (Stigler (1962)). All this hints at the
possibility that economic incentives for employees are possibly better designed in small
rms. More specically, Stigler (1962) attributes this rm-size wage e¤ect to the fact that
the owner of a small company can better judge the quality of her employeesperformance.
Along the lines of Stiglers conjecture, Garen (1985) develops a model based on the
assumption that employeesmonitoring and evaluation costs rise with rm size because of
larger imperfections in acquiring information. He provides empirical evidence supporting
his models prediction that larger rms pay a smaller return to measured ability, but
have a larger intercept in their wage equations, which also found support in Evans &
Leighton (1989). (In our model, where we assume no di¤erences in monitoring employee
cost across rms, the same di¤erences in pay schedules across rms arise from the fact
that the owner of a smaller rm can more accurately relate her managerspay to the
rms prots, which in turn makes managers di¤erentiate employee performance more
than they would do in larger rms.)
5See also Bulow & Summers (1986) and Weiss & Landau (1984) for alternative explanations.
6See also Hamermesh (1980) for a related argument.
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3 Model
In this section, we develop a three-tier agency model of economic organization of a rm
based on the features of vertical managerial structure discussed above. The key element of
the model is the soft budget constraint that managers have with respect to the employee
payroll expense they incur. For the modeling framework, we draw on Tirole (1986), who
study the collusive behavior of managers and employees in a three-tier agency model.
3.1 Framework
Consider a prot-maximizing rm, owned by the owner. In the rm, production is split
among N production divisions. Every division consists of one employee and one man-
ager, and it produces an input to the rms nal product using only the employees labor
services. A division managers job is to induce the employee to exert e¤ort. The manager
does so through designing and implementing a pay-for-e¤ort incentive scheme. (In line
with the practice of job performance appraisal, the manager rewards the employee with
a rating, which translates into the employees monetary pay; therefore, we use ratings
and pay synonymously). The owner, accordingly, is to design a compensation scheme for
managers, rewarding them for their division outputs and penalizing for payroll expenses
subject to informational constraints described below. A larger number of divisions N
stands for a larger size of the rm. The assumption is that the productional or organiza-
tional structures of the rm are exogenous.
Specically, consider a representative division of the rm, the workings and contribu-
tion to the rms prots of which are similar to those of other divisions. An e¤ort e 2 R+,
exerted by the division employee, results in the production of the divisions output V (e),
where V is a production function with the properties Ve > 0 and Vee  0. It costs the
employee a disutility of C(e; ), where C is an e¤ort cost function, and the parameter
 is the employees privately known productivity level distributed on the nite support
; 

according to a twice di¤erentiable common prior distribution F with the proba-
bility density function f (f > 0) satisfying the non-decreasing monotone hazard rate
condition. Later in the analysis in order to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume that
the e¤ort cost function C is separable in e¤ort e and productivity  with its functional
form C(e; ) = g(e)=, where g is a strictly convex twice di¤erentiable function. If o¤ered
a pay (or rating) r 2 [0; r] in return for an e¤ort e, the employee of productivity  can
enjoy a net utility of
UA(r; e; ) = r   C(e; ); (1)
which needs to be at least non-negative for the employee to accept the o¤er (r; e).7 The
gross prot generated by the employee is V (e)   r, which the manager and the owner
7To make the analysis simpler, we allow for a continuous rating (pay) scale.
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need to share.
The assumption is that the division manager knows the workings of his division (func-
tions C;UA; V ) and observes the employees e¤ort e, upon which he can condition his
reward (rating) r. The manager designs pay-for-e¤ort allocations for the employee to
choose from, which the manager does maximizing his own reward coming from the com-
pensation scheme o¤ered by the owner. To have the managers incentives aligned with
the prot maximization of the rm, the owner would like to make the managers compen-
sation proportional to the gross prot V (e)   r generated in his division. However, the
owner can do so only if she possesses the same amount of information about the workings
of the division that the manager does. But with more divisions in the rm or equivalently
in a larger rm the owner has proportionally less time and resources per division needed
to acquire full information. Therefore, the owner designs a compensation scheme for the
manager subject to informational constraints.
We model the owners problem in the following way (which is based on the manage-
ment by objectives paradigm and the evidence about the lack of managerial accountability
for payroll expense as discussed above). The owner o¤ers the manager a compensation
scheme that directly rewards the manager for his accomplishments by granting a fraction
 2 (0; 1) of the output V , created in his division, but can make him internalize only
an  fraction of the payroll cost r, where the parameter  2 [; 1], 0 <  < 1, is in-
versely related to the number of divisions N in the rm (i.e., to its size). In particular,
we assume that  = (N), which is decreasing in N and (1) = 1, limN!1 (N) = .
The parameter , known by all the parties, is assumed to capture all the di¤erences in
information between the manager and the owner. A smaller value of  implies a larger
degree of asymmetric information, which translates into a softer budget constraint for the
manager (because managers can bargain for more advantageous compensation schemes).
Finally, to alleviate the problem of the managers having a soft budget constraint, the
owner can control the managers payroll budget by imposing an upper bound on it. In
our one-employee model, this constraint takes the form of an upper bound r on employee
rewards r at the discretion of the manager.8
Hence, the pay-for-e¤ort allocation (r; e) implemented by the manager results in his
reward of
UM(r; e) = V (e)  r; (2)
8Imposing an upper bound on employee rewards comes naturally from managerspractice of evaluating
their employeesperformance on a nite rating scale, which, together with ratingsmonetary values, is
set from above. In the model, setting an upper bound is all that the owner does when designing employee
performance appraisal standards, other aspects of which are ignored for the sake of tractability. As an
extension to the model, one could also consider a case with many employees, where the owner, besides
imposing an upper bound on rewards, can also constrain the total payroll budget available to the manager.
(In our model with a single employee, this constraint, of course, does not apply.)
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and the net prot accrued to the rm is equal to
(r; e) = (1  )V (e)  (1  )r; (3)
which is the output V less the employee payroll cost r and less the manager compensation.
3.2 Nested Agency Problem
Suppose that every division of the rm functions as the following two-stage game between
the owner, manager, and employee, who are all rational expected utility maximizers.
Given the framework described above, in the rst stage the owner sets a compensation
scheme for the manager. In the second stage, the manager, upon observing his own com-
pensation scheme, designs a set of pay-for-e¤ort allocations for his employee to choose
from. The employee chooses the allocation that maximizes his utility, and after its im-
plementation payo¤s to all the parties follow.
To make the analysis more focused on the properties of employee wage schedules,
we assume that the managers reward fraction  of output produced is exogenously de-
termined (e.g., by the outside labor market for managers). Then, the owners action
concerning the managers compensation scheme is to set an upper bound r 2 R+ on em-
ployee rewards. Applying the revelation principle, the manager designs direct incentive-
compatible pay-for-e¤ort allocations x() = fr(); e()g for every employee productivity
type  2 ; , where the reward and e¤ort allocations are functions dened, respectively,
as r :

; 
 ! [0; r] and e : ;  ! R+. The employee of productivity  announces a
type ^ from the type space

; 

, which leads to the implementation of the allocation
(e(^); r(^)). The resultant utility levels follow from (1) for the employee, from (2) for
the manager, and, respectively, from (3) for the owner. All the utility levels are as-
sumed to satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Finally, to solve the game, we
use the concept of Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, which, in our setting, is a strategy prole
fr;x; ^()g such that each type of every player plays her best reply given the strategies
of the others.
Next, we solve the model by backward induction. Then, we discuss the properties of
the solution obtained with respect to the parameter  (rm size). It will be shown that
the smaller the value the parameter  takes, the more the owner limits the managers
discretion by imposing a lower upper bound on employee rewards. It eventually leads to
the managers designing a atter employee pay schedule with the ensuing compression of
rewards (ratings) and rm-size e¤ects of the type that are documented in the empirical
literature.
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3.2.1 The managers problem, Stage 2
The manager faces a hidden information problem since the employee productivity type
 is privately known. Given his own compensation scheme (; r), with respect to direct
pay-for-e¤ort allocations fr(); e()g2[;] the manager maximizes his expected utility
Z 

(V (e()  r())dF () (4)
subject to
r()  C(e(); )  0; (5)
r()  C(e(); )  r(^)  C(e(^); ); and (6)
0  r()  r; for all  and ^ in [; ]. (7)
The rst two constraints are the employees participation and incentive compatibility
constraints, respectively; and the last one is a constraint on employee rewards imposed
by the owner in the rst stage.
The solution to the managers utility maximization problem without the upper-bound
constraint, eq. (4)(6), can be found by the well-established methods, following Mirrlees
(1971). It is characterized by the functional equation
Ve(e())  [Ce(e(); )  1  F ()
f()
Ce(e(); )] = 0: (8)
Let the e¤ort function eu : [; ]! R+ solve the above equation; then, the corresponding
pay levels ru() are found from
ru() = C(eu(); ) 
Z 

C(e
u(~); ~)d~; for  2 [; ]: (9)
The assumed non-decreasing monotone hazard rate condition ensures that the e¤ort
schedule eu() is increasing in productivity type  and that the no distortion at the
topproperty holds. The solution to the reduced problem xu() = fru(); eu()g2[;]
also constitutes the solution to the full problem if the left-out constraint is not binding,
i.e., if ru()  r.
If constraint (7) is binding, i.e., ru() > r for some , in order to solve the managers
problem we need to modify the solution method, which we do in the Appendix. But then,
as our solution to the full problem shows, the no distortion at the topproperty is no
longer preserved for the optimal pay-for-e¤ort allocations. In particular, provided that the
manager does not nd it optimal to exclude some of the least e¢ cient employee types
which is assumed to be the case throughout the paper, essentially assuming that the mass
11
of ine¢ cient types is large enough we show that the manager should o¤er a uniform pay-
for-e¤ort allocation to some of the most e¢ cient types. The pooling of employee types
takes place because the manager cannot design distinct incentive-compatible allocations
for all the employee types if constrained in rewards. More precisely, since the manager
cannot elicit the rst-best e¤ort level from the most e¢ cient type due to the pay cap
imposed, he has to revert to an e¤ort level that is lower than the rst-best one and make
it available to a pool of employee types.
With a reference to the Appendix for the details of solving the full problem (4)-(7),
its solution x() = fr(); e()g for  2 ;  is given in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 Let xu() = fru(); eu()g for  2 ;  be dened as in eq. (8) and (9).
The solution x() = fr(); e()g2[;] to the managers problem (4)(7) is as follows
 if ru()  r, where r is the owners imposed upper bound reward, then x() = xu();
 otherwise, for employee productivity types  in [; p) the optimal pay-for-e¤ort allo-
cations are fr(); e()g and for types  in [p; ]  fr; e(p)g, where the starting
point p of the pooling interval [p; ] and the e¤ort levels e() for  2 [; p] are
jointly determined by
1  F (p)
f(p)
=
[Ve(e
(p))  Ce(e(p); p)]Ce(e(p))
Ve(e(p))( Ce(e(p); p)) (10)
C(e(p); p) 
Z p

C(e
(); )d = r; (11)
and
[Ve(e
())  Ce(e(); )] + (1  F ())
f()
Ce(e
(); )+ (12)
+
(1  F (p)
f()
Ve(e
(p))  Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e
(); ) = 0:
The pay levels r() for  2 [; p) are equal to
r() = C(e(); ) 
Z 

C(e
(~); ~)d~: (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
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3.2.2 The owners problem, Stage 1
The owners expected residual prot resulting from the managers designed incentive
scheme x = fr; eg is given by
(x) =
Z 

(1  )V (e())  (1  )r()dF (): (14)
The owners problem is to maximize (14) when designing a compensation package for her
manager, i.e., when imposing an upper bound r on employee rewards. Since the rational
owner can discern for herself the optimal employee incentive scheme x, designed by the
manager in the second stage for a given upper bound r, the owners expected prot can
be expressed solely as a function of her action r.
Denote the expected prot function by ~, which is a mapping of an upper bound
r 2 R+ into the prot (x) as in (14), where x is the optimal pay-for-e¤ort allocation
schedule from Proposition 1 for a given r. The function ~ is then dened by
~(r) =
Z ~p(r)

(1  )V (e())  (1  )r()dF ()+ (15)
+ (1  F (~p(r))[(1  )V (e(~p(r)))  (1  )r];
where ~p is a mapping of an upper bound r into the starting point p of the pooling
interval [p; ], as dened in Proposition 1; e() and r() for  2 [; p] are the optimal
pay-for-e¤ort allocations from Proposition 1.
The owner nds the optimal upper bound r maximizing (15) from the rst-order
condition of (15) with respect to r, which is
Ve(e
(~p(r)))e(~
p(r))~pr(r) =
1  
1   : (16)
Di¤erentiating (11) in Proposition 1 with respect to r gives
e(~
p(r))~pr(r) =
1
Ce(e(~p(r); ~p(r))
;
and plugging it into (16) renders the optimality condition for an upper bound r :
Ve(e
(~p(r)))
Ce(e(~p(r)); ~p(r))
=
1  
1   : (17)
Without going into any detail, the second-order condition is assumed to be satised
(although ensuring this may require adding some additional mild assumptions on the
functional forms of the production function V and e¤ort cost function C or, alternatively,
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restricting parameter values).
Condition (17) has a natural interpretation. It requires setting an upper bound r
so that in the optimum it equates the owners marginal revenue (1   )Ve(e(~p(r)))
from the highest e¤ort level e(~p(r)) contracted by the manager with the corresponding
marginal cost of (1   )Ce(e(~p(r)); ~p(r)). When  < 1 (i.e., when the manager
does not internalize his payroll expense incurred in full), the right-hand side of (17) is
greater than one, implying that it is not in the owners interest to have any rst-best
(socially optimal) e¤ort level implemented (where the rst-best level is determined from
Ve(e
FB()) = Ce(e
FB(); ) for any ). Therefore, if  < 1, the owner imposes a binding
upper-bound reward r on the manager in order to reduce the employee e¤orts he elicits
below the socially optimal levels.
3.3 Equilibrium
Having established the conditions of the managers and the owners optimal play
Proposition 1 and eq. (17), respectively we can solve for the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of the game. In our derivations below, we make use of the assumption that the employees
e¤ort cost function C(e; ) is separable in e¤ort and productivity, i.e., C(e; ) = g(e)=,
which, of course, has no qualitative impact on the properties of the equilibrium obtained.
Plugging (17) into (10) from Proposition 1 renders the condition for the starting point
p of the pooling interval

p; 

:
1  F (p)
f(p)
= p
1  
1  : (18)
Since there may be no  from

; 

satisfying the above condition, then the starting point
p of the pooling interval is more generally dened by
p = min( :
1  F ()
f()
   1  
1    0;     ): (19)
Similarly, plugging (17) into (12) from Proposition 1 renders the condition for the optimal
e¤ort levels e() for productivity types  in [; p]:
[Ve(e
())  Ce(e(); )] + Ce(e(); ) (20)



(1  F ())
f()
+
(1  F (p)
f()
1  
1  

= 0:
It is straightforward to see that the e¤ort function e is continuous in employee type .
The optimal pay schedule r() for  in [; p) is given by (13), and it is also continuous
in . Finally, the owner determines the optimal upper bound r, ensuring condition (17)
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holds, from
r = C(e(p); p) 
Z p

C(e
(); )d: (21)
Proposition 2 below summarizes the above results and characterizes the equilibrium
of the game studied above.
Proposition 2 The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game in question is the strategy
prole fr;x; ^()g for  2 ; , where
 the managers optimal strategy x = (r; e) is dened by:
 for employee productivity types  in [; p), with p as in (19), the optimal
allocation is x() = (r(); e()), where the optimal e¤ort and reward levels
e() and r() are dened by (20) and (13), respectively;
 for productivity types  in

p; 

, x() = (r; e(p)), where the e¤ort e(p)
and reward r are found from (20) and (21), respectively;
 the owners optimal strategy r is dened by (21);
 the employee of productivity  in [; p) announces ^() = , and of productivity 
in [p; ]  ^() = p.
4 Equilibrium properties
Below, we discuss the properties of the equilibrium obtained in their relationship to the
parameter  (rm size).
4.1 Pooling at the top
As it follows from Proposition 2 and the derivations preceding it, for the parameter 
values less than 1, the incentive scheme o¤ered by the manager features a uniform pay-
for-e¤ort allocation for employee types  from the non-empty interval [p; ] (if  < 1,
then p <  from (18)). The underlying reason for the existence of the pooling equilib-
rium is the misalignment of the owners and managers interests. When the manager is
not fully accountable for the payroll costs incurred, the owner, who then bears a dispro-
portionately larger share of costs, attempts to limit the managers discretion by imposing
a binding upper bound on employee rewards. Consequently, in response to the upper
bound constraint imposed the manager optimally pools employee types and makes them
subject to the highest available reward.
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Moreover, the lower the value the parameter  takes, the more the manager extends
the pooling-equilibrium interval. Supposing that the starting point p from (19) is in
(; ), it follows from (18) that the internal derivative dp=d is positive:
dp
d
=  
p( 1 
(1 )2 )
d
dp

1 F (p)
f(p)

    1 
1 
 > 0; (22)
where in the denominator the derivative of the inverse hazard rate is negative (due to the
assumption).
Proposition 3 summarizes the above ndings.
Proposition 3 With  < 1, the employee types  in [p; ], where p <  due to (19),
are subject to the uniform pay-for-e¤ort allocation (r; e(p)), dened in Proposition 2.
If p 2 (; ), the length of the pooling-equilibrium interval [p; ] decreases in .
With this result in mind, we argue later that the lenient job performance appraisal
practice with the ensuing compression of ratings can, in fact, be an equilibrium outcome.
4.2 Wage dispersion
In this subsection, we argue that in equilibrium the range of rewards [r(); r] increases
in the parameter , i.e., the smaller a rm is, the higher the wage (pay) dispersion is in the
rm. To make this argument, we take the internal derivatives de(p)=d and de()=d
of equilibrium conditions (17) and (20) for  = , respectively, and show that the rst
one is positive and provide conditions when the second one is negative, from which the
postulated result follows (in particular, we then have dr=d > 0 and dr()=d < 0).
The owners optimality condition (17) shows that with the parameter  decreasing
(which makes the right-hand side of (17) increase), the owner wants the managers highest
e¤ort level contracted e(p) to be lower. Formally, the internal derivative de(p)=d of
(17) is positive:
de(p)
d
=   Ce(e
(p); p)
(1  )Vee(e(p)  (1  )Cee(e(p); p)) > 0:
Therefore, with smaller values of , in order to attain a lower e¤ort level in equilibrium
e(p), the owner has to impose a lower upper bound on employee rewards, implying that
dr=d is positive. To put it in words, the more unaccountable her managers are, the
more the owner constrains their discretion about employee compensation.
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Next, we take the internal derivative de()=d of (20) to obtain at  =  :
de()
d
=  
  ge
2
[ + 1
f()
  dp
d
f(p)
f()
1 
1    1 F (
p)
f()(1 ) ]
Vee   gee   gee2 [ 1f() + (1 F (
p)
f()
1 
1  ]

  
  ge
2
[ + 1
f()
  1 
f()
1 F (p)
1    1 F (
p)
f()(1 ) ]
Vee   gee   gee2 [ 1f() + (1 F (
p)
f()
1 
1  ]
; (23)
where the arguments of functions V and C are dropped for more clarity, and we also
use C(e; ) = g(e)=. (The second line of the above expression is obtained by replacing
dp=d in the numerator with the largest value it can take, see (22), and by using pooling
condition (18)). Since Vee  0 and gee > 0, the denominator of the above expression
is negative. The numerator is also negative if the expression in the square brackets is
positive, which, however, is dependent on parameter values. To have this expression
positive, we make the following assumptions: the employee is cost-e¢ cient enough, i.e.,
the lowest-bound productivity  takes a large enough value and/or the managers share
of output, the parameter , is not too large.9 If these (reasonable) assumptions are met,
then de()=d is negative, implying that dr()=d < 0 (as follows from (13)). Since the
optimal e¤ort and reward allocations are continuous in type , the dispersion of rewards
increases in parameter .
Intuitively, this equilibrium property stipulates that with less accountable managers
in her rm the owner tries to limit the payroll expenses they incur by lowering the upper
bound on employee rewards. It eventually makes a reward-constrained manager distort
the incentives of most e¢ cient employee types even further by attempting to elicit more
e¤ort from less able types.
Proposition 4 below summarizes the equilibrium property discussed, which is also
illustrated in the numerical example of the next subsection.
Proposition 4 The highest available employee reward r and lowest contracted reward
r(), dened in Proposition 2, are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in parameter
 if the employee is cost e¢ cient enough and the managers share of output  is not too
large (to ensure de()=d  0 in (23)). Then, given the continuity of the equilibrium
reward schedule r, the range of wage dispersion [r(); r] increases in parameter .
4.3 Wage premium
Here, we show how a large-rm wage premium can arise in our model. What we need to
demonstrate is that for a given distribution for productivity the expected employee wage
increases in rm size or, in our model, decreases in manager-accountability parameter .
9The sign of the expression in the brackets only marginally depends on the value of  since with
! 1, F (p)! 1.
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For a given value of , let r denote the expected equilibrium employee wage characterized
in Proposition 2, i.e.,
r =
Z 

r()f()d;
and let V  denote the expected equilibrium output:
V  =
Z 

V (e())f()d:
As we are going to see, the relationship between expected wage r and rm-size proxy 
is not monotonous over the whole range of values of . However, for the range of  where
the expected output V  decreases in  the expected employee wage will also decrease in
, but the rm prot will increase in it. (In words, we show that if in a larger rm the
employee is observed to produce more, his wage will be higher, but the rms prot will
be lower than those of a smaller rm, respectively.)
Before giving the analytical argument, we illustrate our result with a numerical ex-
ample for the following specication of the model. The production function V is linear
in e¤ort, V (e) = e; the e¤ort cost function takes the form of C(e; ) = e2=(2); the
employee types are uniformly distributed on the type space [5; 10], i.e.,  = 5;  = 10; the
managers output share  = 0:15; and the parameter  takes values from [0:5; 1]. Using
this specication, we calculate the equilibrium results of Proposition 2, which are illus-
trated in Figure 1. Its diagrams a), b), and c) plot for di¤erent values of  the employees
expected e¤ort and wage, and the rms expected prot; employee wage dispersion; and
the pooling-equilibrium starting point p, respectively.
Diagram a) of Figure 1 shows that the expected equilibrium employee wage is not
a monotonous function of . We observe a large-rm wage premium over the interval
[0:814; 1], i.e., where the expected employee wage declines in ; see the dashed line. (The
fact that r does not decline at every value of  is not surprising: with very unaccountable
managers, i.e., for low values of , the owner signicantly suppresses the managers
discretion over wages by imposing a low upper bound on the employee wage schedule.)
As we can also see from the diagram, the expected employee output follows the same
dynamics as the expected wage: at the interval, where the large-rm wage premium is
observed, V  also decreases in  (see the dashdot line). At the same time, the expected
prot of a rm monotonically increases in  (see the dotted line; this outcome naturally
follows from the model: the less accountable the managers are, the lower the prot a
rm has, ceteris paribus). To put it in words, the expected prot and payroll expense
of a small rm, everything else equal, can be respectively higher and lower than those of
a larger rm (matching the empirical evidence of rm-size e¤ects on average wages and
prots). The reason for this, as we argue, is managerslower degree of accountability in
larger rms, which boosts employee payroll expenses (and, correspondingly, their e¤orts
18
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c) Pooling equilibrium starting point qp
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exerted) beyond the prot-maximizing levels of the rm, leading to protability losses.
Formally, we state and prove the following proposition on the incidence of the wage
premium, which implications we discuss in the next section.
Proposition 5 If the expected output per employee, characterized in Proposition 2, in-
creases in rm size, then the expected wage also increases in rm size, but the expected
prot decreases.
Proof. Consider two rms, rm 1 and rm 2, with distinct manager accountability levels
1 and 2, respectively, with 1 > 2 (i.e., rm 1 is smaller in size than rm 2). Let the
output produced in rm 2 is greater than that in rm 1: V 1 < V 2 . Contrary to what
we need to prove, suppose that the prot of rm 2 is greater than or equal to that of rm
1: 1  2. Applying our denition of the prot, we have
(1  )V 2   (1  2)r2  (1  )V 1   (1  1)r1 ;
or
(1  )V 2   (1  1)r2 > (1  )V 1   (1  1)r1 ;
and diving by (1  ) and rearranging yield
V 2   V 1 > (1  1)
(1  )
 
r2   r1 : (24)
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Since V 2   V 1 > 0, this inequality holds for any coe¢ cient in front of  r2   r1
smaller than (1   1)=(1   ). At the same time, since the manager of rm 1 chooses
the contract that elicits the expected e¤ort V 1 and payroll expense r1 rather than V 2
and r2 (which are also feasible for the manager) it must be that
V 1   1r1  V 2   1r2 :
Rearranging this inequality yields
V 2   V 1  1
 
r2   r1 : (25)
Since 1 < (1   1)=(1   ), inequalities (24) and (25) cannot simultaneously hold.
Hence, it must be that 1 > 2. Finally, since V 2   V 1 > 0, we also have from (25)
that r2 > r1 .
Finally, Figure 1 also illustrates Propositions 3 and 4. In Diagram b), we obtain
the inverse relationship between rm size and wage dispersion: the gap between the
highest and lowest pay increases in . Diagram c) depicts the compression of ratings
(rewards) phenomenon. For any  less than one, employee types at the high end of
productivity distribution are pooled for the same reward, and the pooling-equilibrium
interval decreases in .
Furthermore, the patterns of wage variation in rms, demonstrated in Figure 1, are ro-
bust against other specications of the model. For example, the same patterns including
the existence of a threshold value of , after which the expected wage declines in  are
also observed for monotonically increasing, decreasing, or bell-shapedprobability den-
sity functions f . Neither does the result change if the production function is taken to
be strictly concave in e¤ort e, e.g., V (e) = e with  < 1, or to have returns to scale
V (e) = e=s, where s 2 R+ is a returns-to-scale parameter (then, there is a range of
parameter s values, for which protability still decreases with rm size).
5 Discussion
In the introduction, we raised the empirical stylized facts of the compression of ratings
(rewards) and of the rm-size e¤ects that we want to explain in this paper. Below,
we relate these facts with our theoretical results obtained. In addition, drawing on our
ndings, we provide di¤erent interpretations of some empirical evidence presented in the
related literature.
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5.1 Compression of ratings
It has been long observed that variation in rewards (ratings) is smaller than variation in
the actual performance for which the rewards have been granted, see Murphy & Cleveland
(1995). Relating this observation to our model, we argue that the compression of ratings
can, in fact, be an outcome of managersoptimal performance evaluation strategy. If
constrained in employee rewards, which he is only partially accountable for, a manager
nds it optimal to extract more e¤ort from low-productivity employee types even at
the expense of distorting the incentives of high-productivity employee types. Given the
results in Propositions 2 and 3, the manager di¤erentiates only among those e¤ort levels
that are within the range [e(); e(p)], and the width of this e¤ort range decreases with
rm size. So if an employee for one or another reason exerts an e¤ort level above e(p)
the manager would still give her the same reward of r.
Akerlof (1982) provides a specic example, where the incentives in place for cash
posters at the Eastern Utilities Co. seemed to be suboptimal either from the employees
or the employers perspective. In this example, employees were paid the same wage
provided they recorded at least 300 postings per hour, and no bonuses or promotion
promises were given for exceeding the limit. Some cash posters, however, did exceed the
limit, but still were paid the same wage. It raised the question of why those overworking
cash posters did not reduce their e¤ort levels, or, on the other hand, why the employer
did not provide additional incentives for them to extract even more e¤ort.
In addition to the gift-exchangeexplanation by Akerlof (1982), our model can give
another insight into the agency problem described. The xed pay o¤ered for at least
300 recorded postings could, in fact, constitute an optimal employee incentive scheme,
where optimal,from the managers perspective, is to maximize the number of postings
recorded. Technically, in our model, for low enough values of  the pooling equilibrium
may stretch out to comprise the whole employee type space (see condition (19)). To
put it in words, if the manager is not held very accountable for the payroll expense he
incurs, to set a uniform incentive scheme, just meeting the participation constraint of
low-productivity employees, can be optimal for the manager. However, why all the cash
posters would not simply meet the prescribed limit is a question beyond the scope of our
model.
5.2 Firm-size e¤ects
The rm-size e¤ects on wages take the form of a higher average wage and lower wage
dispersion in larger rms (see Oi & Idson (1999); Garen (1985); Brown & Medo¤ (1989)).
Given our assumption that a larger size means a larger asymmetry in information between
the owner and managers, our model shows that the empirical regularities observed in
practice can constitute an equilibrium outcome as well.
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With regard to wage dispersion, we argue that the smaller a rm is (or the more
accountable its managers are), the more e¢ cient economic incentives for the rms em-
ployees are put in place, and vice versa. It accordingly leads to the inverse relationship
between wage dispersion and rm size (see Proposition 4). The reason for this result is
that a larger rm has a more aggravated soft-budget-constraint problem, which prompts
its owner to curb her managersdiscretion about employee pay in order to avoid exces-
sive payroll expenses. Managers respond to that, as discussed in the preceding subsection
about the compression of ratings, by setting coarser reward schemes leading to a shal-
lower di¤erentiation of good from bad performance levels. This result has strong empirical
support. Stigler (1962, Table 5) reports wage dispersion to vary inversely with rm size;
Garen (1985) and Evans & Leighton (1989) report returns to employee productivity and
skills (experience) to be higher in smaller rms.
As for the large-rm wage premium, our model also o¤ers a di¤erent view of this
phenomenon. In Proposition 5, we argue that it can be an equilibrium outcome of the
agency problem studied here that the larger a rm is, the higher its average wage is. A
higher average wage comes from a higher average e¤ort exerted, which empirically can
be interpreted as meaning that workers are more productive in larger rms (see Idson
& Oi (1999)). But as our model shows, it may not necessarily be the case. In larger
rms, for the reasons explained before, managers design employee incentive schemes that
elicit more e¤ort from low-productivity employees (whose incentives, otherwise, would be
distorted to elicit more e¤ort from high-productivity employees). As a result, one can
observe that employees in larger rms exert on average more e¤ort, which, however, does
not mean that they are more productive per se. It could be the incentive schemes o¤ered
by their managers that make them exert more e¤ort on average, but this may not be in
the rms best interest.
In fact, our argument is reinforced by the empirical ndings from nancial studies
about smaller rms having higher stock returns and, supposedly, higher levels of prof-
itability (see Banz (1981); Fama & French (1992)). Hence, if workers in smaller rms
are less productive (as argued, for example, in Idson & Oi (1999)), then how does this
match with the fact that smaller rms have higher levels of protability? Nonetheless,
in our model, we do obtain that small rms are more protable, which immediately fol-
lows from the models structure. The owner of a smaller rm can more accurately align
her managerscompensation scheme with the rms prot maximization. At the same
time, our model predicts that the average e¤ort level decreases with rm size, but this is
optimal from the rms prot maximization perspective.
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6 Conclusion
Based on the observation that managers have a soft budget constraint when evaluating
their employeesperformance, this paper argues that the documented empirical regular-
ities of the compression of ratings and rm-size e¤ects can be the equilibrium outcomes
of the model presented here. Given the idea that the owner of a rm cannot perfectly
align her managersincentives with the rms prot maximization, the owner attempts to
restrain her managerspayroll spending by putting an upper bound on employee rewards.
This, subsequently, leads to managers designing atter pay-for-e¤ort allocations for their
employees, which can be behind the compression of ratings phenomenon. Assuming that
in smaller rms managers are held more accountable for their actions as empirical evi-
dence indicates the model makes predictions that are in line with the empirical evidence
from the industrial psychology, labor, and nance literature on rm-size e¤ects. All in
all, manager accountability can be a cause of the systematic di¤erences observed in em-
ployee wage schedules. A further research direction could be to empirically test various
predictions of the model in order to distinguish them more clearly from other alternative
theories.
7 Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we solve the managers problem, (4)(7), with upper-bound constraint (7) binding.
To illustrate better the argument behind the solution, we approach the problem through
its discrete version, and then take the limit of the results obtained to arrive at the solution
with the continuous employee type space.
Discretization
We discretize the employee type space

; 

into n discrete types (1; :::; i; :::; n),
where an employee type i = +(i  1)@, for i = 1; :::; n, and @ = (  )=n. Then, we
discretize the initial (continuous) distribution F for employee types by dening probability
weights p(i) =
R i+@
i
f()d for every i, which is the probability mass of the employee
types within the interval [i; i + @]. (From this discretization, we later switch to the
continuous case by taking the limit n!1; or @ ! 0.)
The discrete version of the managers optimization problem eq. (4)(7) is as follows.
With respect to pay-for-e¤ort allocations fr(i); e(i)gi=1;:::;n the manager maximizes his
expected utility
nX
i=1
p(i)[V (e(i))  r(i)]
subject to
r(i)  C(e(i); i)  0; (Pi)
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r(i)  C(e(i); i)  r(j)  C(e(j); i); (ICi)
0  r(i)  r; for every i = 1; :::; n and j 6= i. (26)
Setting up the Lagrangian
As it is standard, rst, we reduce the problem above by singling out the constraints
that need to be binding in the optimum. Let a pay-for-e¤ort schedule of allocations
x = fr(i); e(i)gi=1;:::;n be the solution to the managers problem. For x to be the
solution, we must have that the schedules e and r are monotonically increasing in 
(it follows from incentive compatibility) and r(n) = r (it follows from the binding
upper-bound constraint and the monotonicity). Next, we make the following (strict
monotonicity) conjecture.
Conjecture 1 For any partition of the employee type space, the solution to the managers
problem consists of pay-for-e¤ort allocations distinct for every employee type.
Essentially, we conjecture that only the most e¢ cient type n obtains the highest
reward of r, which later we need to check if it is valid.
In the optimum, the adjacent IC constraints need to be downward binding:
r(i)  C(e(i); i) = r(i 1)  C(e(i 1); i); i = 2; :::; n: (27)
The only binding participation constraint is that of the least e¢ cient agent type from
those contracted upon. We impose it to be P1, i.e.,
r(1)  C(e(1); 1) = 0;
assuming that in the population there is a large enough mass of ine¢ cient employee types.
Finally, if the above binding constraints and the monotonicity constraint hold, then due
to the Spence-Mirrlees property the rest of constraints also hold.
In the optimum, stemming from the constraints in (27) and the binding participation
constraint, it has to be that for the pay levels r(i), i = 2; :::; n, we have
r(i) =
Xi
j=1
C(e(j); j) 
Xi
j=2
C(e(j 1); j); (28)
which are used to eliminate the pay allocations r from the maximization problem. Ac-
cordingly, at the top of the type space it has to be that
r  
nX
i=1
C(e(i); i) +
nX
i=2
C(e(i 1); i) = 0; (29)
which, in what follows, characterizes the the upper-bound constraint (26).
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Next, we set the Lagrangian of the reduced optimization problem, which is
L(fe(i)gni=1; ) = p(1)[V (e(1))  C(e(1); 1)]+
+
n 1X
i=2
p(i)[V (e(i))  (
Xi
j=1
C(e(j); j) 
Xi
j=2
C(e(j 1); j))]+
+ p(n)[V (e(n))  r] + (r  
nX
i=1
C(e(i); i) +
nX
i=2
C(e(i 1); i));
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of upper-bound constraint (29). (Other constraints
enter the Lagrangian through r(i) replaced by (28).)
The rst-order conditions with respect to the e¤ort levels e(i) for i = 1; :::; n  1
are
p(i)[Ve(e(i))  Ce(e(i); i)]  [
Xn 1
j=i+1
p(j) + ] (30)
(Ce(e(i); i)  Ce(e(i); i+1)) = 0;
and with respect to e(n) it is
p (n)Ve(e(n))  Ce(e(n); n) = 0: (31)
Solving these n rst-order conditions together with constraint (29) give us the optimal
e¤ort levels e(i), i = 1; :::; n, with the corresponding pay levels r(i) following from
P1 and (28). If at the limit n ! 1, the pay-for-e¤ort allocations obtained are distinct
for every employee type with the e¤ort schedule monotonically increasing, then it is the
solution to the managers problem (4)(7).
But, as is shown below, for ne partitions of the employee type space the perfect
screening of employee types cannot be optimal. The manager can do better by pooling
some of the most e¢ cient types.
Pooling at the top
Let ~e(i), i = 1; :::; n, solve the above rst-order conditions. It must be that the e¤ort
level ~e(n) aimed at the most e¢ cient employee type is less than the rst-best e¤ort level
dened as efb(n) = fe(n) : Ve(e(n))  Ce(e(n); n) = 0g.10 It results in the e¢ ciency
loss of Ve(~e(n))  Ce(~e(n); n) > 0 and implies  > p(n).
10To see this, if ~e(n) = efb(n), then  = p(n), from which it follows that the e¤ort levels ~e(i)
for all i are identical to the optimal e¤ort levels from the problem without the upper-bound constraint.
But since the upper bound constraint is binding, the e¤ort levels ~e(i) cannot be implemented in the
incentive compatible way (provided, of course, the manager does not exclude any low types, which is
ruled out).
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Next, through the Lagrange multiplier  we combine the adjacent rst-order condi-
tions for ~e(n) and ~e(n 1) to get
p(n)
p(n 1)
=
[Ve(~e(n 1))  Ce(~e(n 1); n 1)]C(~e(n))
V (~e(n))[Ce(~e(n 1); n 1)  Ce(~e(n 1); n)] : (32)
Multiplying both sides by @ and taking the limit @ ! 0 (equivalent to taking the limit
n ! 1) render that the left-hand side of the above expression tends to zero (since the
limit lim
n!1
p(n)=p(n 1) = 1). At the same time, the right-hand side is equal to
[Ve(~e())  Ce(~e(); )]Ce(~e())
Ve(~e())( Ce(~e(); ))
;
which remains strictly positive because of Ve(~e())  Ce(~e(); ) > 0.
Hence, for the continuum of employee types (or for ne partitions of the employee
type space) the derived optimality (rst-order) conditions cannot support the distinct
pay-for-e¤ort allocations conjectured Conjecture 1 does not hold at the limit. For ne
type space partitions, to meet the optimality conditions the manager has to pool some
of the most e¢ cient employee types by making them subject to the highest reward of r.
Then, we continue with gradually increasing the probability mass of employee types
subject to the highest reward and denote this mass by P (m) =
Pn
j=m p(j), where
m = n   1; n   2; :::. We repeat the above solution algorithm for di¤erent m (with m
replacing n in the above derivations) until we have the optimality conditions met. In
particular, for a given m, the rst-order condition equivalent to (31) is:
P (m)Ve(e(m))  Ce(e(m); m) = 0; (33)
while the rest of the rst-order conditions for i = 1; :::;m   1 remain intact (again con-
jecturing that the e¤ort schedule is increasing in the employee type).
The equivalent expression to (32) is
P (m)
p(m 1)
=
[Ve(e(m 1))  Ce(e(m 1); m 1)]C(e(m))
V (e(m))[Ce(e(m 1); m 1)  Ce(e(m 1); m)] : (34)
Multiplying both sides by @ and taking the limit @ ! 0 on both sides render the
optimal pooling condition:
1  F (p)
f(p)
=
[Ve(e(
p))  Ce(e(p); p)]Ce(e(p))
Ve(e(p))( Ce(e(p); p)) ; (35)
where p is the employee type for which the above optimality condition holds (which
is exactly (10) in Proposition 1). The productivity type p is the starting point of the
pooling interval [p; ], for which the uniform allocation (e(p); r) applies. The e¤ort level
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e(p) is pinned down by the remaining optimality conditions as dened below.
The optimal allocations fe(); r()g2[;]
Having established the pooling condition (35) and reverting to the continuous case
henceforth, from (33) the Lagrange multiplier is equal to
 = (1  F (p)) aVe(e(
p))
Ce(e(p); p)
:
Plugging it into the remaining rst-order conditions (30) and taking the continuous ver-
sion of them render for any   p
[Ve(e())  Ce(e(); )] + (1  F ())
f()
Ce(e(); )+ (36)
+
(1  F (p)
f()
Ve(e(
p))  Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e(); ) = 0;
which is (12) in Proposition 1. Finally, the last condition that needs to be met is constraint
(29), the continuous version of which is
r = C(e(p); p) 
Z p

C(e(); )d; (37)
which is (11) in Proposition 1.
All in all, conditions (35)(37) together determine the optimal e¤ort levels e() for
all  in [; ]. Given the modeling assumptions imposed, one can easily verify the second-
order condition of (36) is met and that the monotonicity constraint for e to be increasing
that has been omitted holds. Finally, the optimal pay levels r() for  in [; p) follow
from the continuous version of (28), which is (13) in Proposition 1.
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